Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/130508
Authors: 
Möller, Marc
Watanabe, Makoto
Year of Publication: 
2016
Series/Report no.: 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 16-020/VII
Abstract: 
When products are sold in advance, i.e. prior to consumption, consumers trade off an early, uninformed purchase at a low price against a late, informed purchase at a high price. This paper considers the effect of market structure on the prevalence of advance selling. We show that in an oligopolistic market with multi-product firms, advance selling (with its associated allocative inefficiency) is decreasing in market concentration when the consumers’ preference uncertainty is high but can be increasing when uncertainty is low.
Subjects: 
Competition
Price Discrimination
Individual Demand Uncertainty
Advance Purchase Discounts
JEL: 
D43
D80
L13
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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