Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/130350
Authors: 
Casarico, Alessandra
Facchini, Giovanni
Frattini, Tommaso
Year of Publication: 
2016
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Papers 9666
Abstract: 
We develop a model to understand the trade-offs faced by an elected representative in supporting an amnesty when a restrictive immigration policy is in place. We show that an amnesty is more desirable the more restricted are the occupational opportunities of undocumented immigrants and the less redistributive is the welfare state. Empirical evidence based on the voting behavior of U.S. Congressmen on the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 provides strong support for the predictions of our theoretical model.
Subjects: 
migration policy
amnesties
democracy
roll call votes
JEL: 
F22
O51
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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