Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/130265
Authors: 
Drago, Carlo
Ricciuti, Roberto
Santella, Paolo
Year of Publication: 
2015
Series/Report no.: 
Nota di Lavoro, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei 82.2015
Abstract: 
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the effects on the Italian directorship network of the corporate governance reform that was introduced in Italy in 2011 to prevent interlocking directorships in the financial sector. Interlocking directorships are important communication channels among companies and may have anticompetitive effect. We apply community detection techniques to the analysis of the networks in 2009 and 2012 to ascertain the effect of the reform. We find that, although the number of interlocking directorships decreases in 2012, the reduction takes place mainly at the periphery of the network whereas the network core is stable, allowing the most connected companies to keep their strategic position.
Subjects: 
Interlocking Directorships
Corporate Governance
Community Detection
Social Networks
JEL: 
C33
G34
G38
L14
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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