Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/129714 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2015
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Sveriges Riksbank Working Paper Series No. 300
Verlag: 
Sveriges Riksbank, Stockholm
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper provides a microfounded information acquisition technology based on a simple framework with information search. When searchable information is limited, an agent encounters increasingly more redundant information in his search for new information. Redundancy slows down the learning process and generates decreasing returns. Furthermore, as multiple agents search for information from the same source, limited searchability leads to covariance as the acquired information becomes increasingly more overlapped among agents. Using an asymptotic approach, we construct a tractable mapping from resource (attention) allocations to the precision and the correlation of agents.information under varying degrees of searchability of information. We study two economic applica- tions with endogenous information acquisition using our model: (i) a "beauty contest" coordination game, and (ii) a noisy rational expectations equilibrium.
Schlagwörter: 
information processing
concavity
precision
asymptotic analysis
coordination games
portfolio choice
financial equilibrium
JEL: 
C65
D80
D81
D83
G11
G14
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
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