Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/129598
Authors: 
Anderson, Simon P.
Peitz, Martin
Year of Publication: 
2015
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper Series, Department of Economics, University of Mannheim 15-16
Abstract: 
We customize the aggregative game approach to oligopoly to study asymmetric media markets. Advertiser, platform, and consumer surplus are tied together by a simple summary statistic. When media are ad-financed and ads are a nuisance to consumers we establish see-saws between consumers and advertisers. Entry of a lower-quality platform increases consumer surplus, but decreases advertiser surplus if industry platform profits decrease with entry. Merger decreases consumer surplus, but advertiser surplus increases when the profits of the higher-quality platform within the merger increase. By contrast, when platforms use two-sided pricing or consumers like advertising,advertiser and consumer interests are often aligned.
Subjects: 
media economics
mergers
entry
advertising
aggregative games
JEL: 
D43
L13
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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