Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/129566 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2014
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper Series No. 14-13
Verlag: 
University of Mannheim, Department of Economics, Mannheim
Zusammenfassung: 
We use quantifiers and selection functions to represent simultaneous move games. Quantifiers and selection functions are examples of higher-order functions. A higher order function is a function whose domain is itself a set of functions. Thus, quantifiers and selection func- tions allow players to form goals not only about outcomes but about the whole (or parts) of the game play. They encompass standard pref- erences and utility functions as special cases, but also extend to non-maximizing behavior and context-dependent motives. We adapt the Nash equilibrium concept to our new representation and also introduce a refinement to capture the essential features of context-dependent motives. As an example, we discuss fixpoint operations as context dependent goals of coordination and differentiation in simultaneous game variants of Keyne's beauty contest and the minority game.
Schlagwörter: 
context dependent refinement of Nash equilibrium
higher order functions
quantifiers
selection functions
beauty contest
minority game
endogenous economist
JEL: 
C0
D01
D03
D63
D64
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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