Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/129550
Authors: 
Winschel, Evguenia
Year of Publication: 
2012
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper Series, Department of Economics, University of Mannheim 13-08
Abstract: 
This paper studies coalition formation under asymmetric information. An outside party offers private payments in order to influence the collective decision over an unpopular reform. The willingness to accept such payments is private information. The paper demonstrates that a supermajority coalition induces truth-telling and secures the implementation of the decision for a price close to the full information minimal winning coalition price. On the contrary, if the minimal winning coalition is formed, then no revelation is possible.
Subjects: 
coalition formation
minimal winning coalition
supermajority coalition
private information
JEL: 
D71
D72
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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