Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/127113
Authors: 
Kazumura, Tomoya
Serizawa, Shigehiro
Year of Publication: 
2015
Series/Report no.: 
ISER Discussion Paper, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University 943
Abstract: 
Consider the problem of allocating objects to agents and how much they should pay. Each agent has a preference relation over pairs of a set of objects and a payment. Preferences are not necessarily quasi-linear. Non-quasi-linear preferences describe environments where payments influence agents' abilities to utilize objects. This paper is to investigate the possibility of designing efficient and strategy-proof rules in such environments. A preference relation is single demand if an agent wishes to receive at most one object; it is multi demand if whenever an agent receives one object, an additional object makes him better off. We show that if a domain contains all the single demand preferences and at least one multi demand preference relation, and there are more agents than objects, then no rule satisfies efficiency, strategy-proofness, individual rationality, and no subsidy for losers on the domain.
Subjects: 
strategy-proofness
efficiency
multi demand preferences
single demand preferences
non-quasi-linear preferences
minimum price Walrasian rule
JEL: 
D44
D71
D61
D82
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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