Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/125581
Authors: 
Bossler, Mario
Year of Publication: 
2015
Citation: 
[Journal:] IZA Journal of European Labor Studies [ISSN:] 2193-9012 [Publisher:] Springer [Place:] Heidelberg [Volume:] 4 [Year:] 2015 [Issue:] 8 [Pages:] 1-17
Abstract: 
Using new linked employer-employee data from Germany, this article provides the first evidence on the effect of employer provided occupational pensions on work engagement. Famous efficiency wage theories predict that pensions enhance effort if a risk of forfeiture of pension claims is present. Exploiting the German non-forfeiture clause for employer-provided pensions, the results are consistent with the theoretical prediction and show that pensions in combination with the risk of forfeiture exert a positive effect on work engagement. Since occupational pension claims are selectively distributed across establishments, I control for establishment heterogeneity, but point estimates remain of the same size. Conditional quantile regression estimates indicate that especially the lower end of the engagement distribution is affected, which suggests that pensions combined with the risk of forfeiture are effective to reduce incentives for shirking.
Subjects: 
Occupational pensions
Non-forfeiture clause
Efficiency wages
Delayed compensation
Work engagement
JEL: 
J14
J26
J32
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
Document Type: 
Article

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