Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/125269
Authors: 
McVicar, Duncan
Year of Publication: 
2014
Citation: 
[Journal:] IZA World of Labor [ISSN:] 2054-9571 [Year:] 2014 [Issue:] 49
Abstract: 
Unemployment benefits often reduce incentives to search for a job. Policymakers have responded to this behaviour by setting minimum job search requirements, by monitoring to check that unemployment benefit recipients are engaged in the appropriate level of job search activity, and by imposing sanctions for infractions. Empirical studies consistently show that job search monitoring and benefit sanctions reduce unemployment duration and increase job entry in the short term. There is some evidence that longer-term effects of benefit sanctions may be negative.
Subjects: 
unemployment
job search
sanctions
monitoring
JEL: 
I38
J65
J68
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Article

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