Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/123774
Authors: 
Schroth, Josef
Year of Publication: 
2015
Series/Report no.: 
Bank of Canada Working Paper 2015-27
Abstract: 
This paper studies an economy where agents can spend resources on consuming a private good and on funding a public good. There is asymmetric information regarding agents' relative preference for private versus public good consumption. I show how private good consumption should be coordinated across agents within each period to ensure efficient contributions to fund the public good. If agents contributed similar amounts in the past, then coordination takes the form of positively correlated contributions in the current period. If an agent contributed more in the past, then coordination prescribes statecontingent socially wasteful private good consumption in the current period for that agent.
Subjects: 
Fiscal policy
Financial stability
Financial system regulation and policies
JEL: 
E62
H21
H23
H77
D82
D86
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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