Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/123483 
Authors: 
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
EPRI Working Paper No. 2013-5
Publisher: 
The University of Western Ontario, Economic Policy Research Institute (EPRI), London (Ontario)
Abstract: 
The economic crisis that began in 2007 and still lingers has invited comparison with the Great Depression of the 1930s. It has also generated renewed interest in Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz's explanation of the latter as mainly the consequence of the Fed's failure as a lender of last resort at its onset, and the ineptitude of its policies thereafter. This explanation is reassessed in the light of events since 2007, and it is argued that its plausibility emerges enhanced, even though policy debates in recent years have paid more attention to interest rates and credit markets than to Friedman and Schwartz's key variable, the quantity of money
Subjects: 
Great Depression
Great Contraction
Great Recession
Keynesianism
Monetarism
Lender of Last Resort
Money
High-powered money
Monetary base
Currency
Bank reserves
Quantitative easing
Open-market operations
JEL: 
B22
E32
E51
E58
N2
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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