Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/123283
Authors: 
Köhler, Katrin
Pagel, Beatrice
Rau, Holger A.
Year of Publication: 
2015
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Papers, Center for European Governance and Economic Development Research 267
Abstract: 
We analyze the role of worker participation for the success of minimum remuneration policies. In our experiments employers remunerate workers doing a real-effort task. We vary the way how a minimum remuneration policy is introduced. In the worker-participation treatment, workers bargain with the employer on the enforcement of the policy. In the control treatment the policy is exogenously introduced. We find a pronounced effort increase after the policy was enforced. An exogenous introduction has detrimental effects, i.e., employers frequently pay a premium to maintain performance. Thus, worker participation may be an effective means for maintaining reciprocity under minimum remuneration policies.
Subjects: 
bargaining
experiment
real effort
worker participation
JEL: 
C91
J31
J33
M52
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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