Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/122147
Authors: 
Yildirim, Mustafa
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 746
Abstract: 
We propose a political theory for the slow adoption of technology in sports and other contests. We investigate players' preferences for new technology that improves contest accuracy. Modeling accuracy as the elasticity of "production" in a standard Tullock contest, we show that players may be against higher accuracy if heterogeneity among them is:(1) sufficiently low; (2) moderate but the initial accuracy is low; or (3) high but the initial accuracy is high. We apply our results to the recent adoption of goal-line technology by major European soccer leagues.
Subjects: 
contest accuracy
politics
slow technology adoption
goal-line technology
JEL: 
C72
D44
D72
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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