Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/121388
Authors: 
Breinlich, Holger
Nocke, Volker
Schutz, Nicolas
Year of Publication: 
2015
Series/Report no.: 
SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper 519
Abstract: 
In a two-country international trade model with oligopolistic competition, we study the conditions on market structure and trade costs under which a merger policy designed to benefit domestic consumers is too tough or too lenient from the viewpoint of the foreign country. Calibrating the model to match industry-level data in the U.S. and Canada, we show that at present levels of trade costs merger policy is too tough in the vast majority of sectors. We also quantify the resulting externalities and study the impact of different regimes of coordinating merger policies at varying levels of trade costs.
Subjects: 
Mergers and Acquisitions
Merger Policy
Trade Policy
Oligopoly
International Trade
JEL: 
F12
F13
L13
L44
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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