Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/121367
Authors: 
Niedermayer, Andreas
Shneyerov, Artyom
Xu, Pia
Year of Publication: 
2015
Series/Report no.: 
SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper 522
Abstract: 
We develop a novel theory of real estate foreclosure auctions, which have the special feature that the lender acts as a seller for low and as a buyer for high prices. The theory yields several empirically testable predictions concerning the strategic behavior of the agents, both under symmetric and asymmetric information. Using novel data from Palm Beach County (FL, US), we find evidence of both strategic behavior and asymmetric information, with the lender being the informed party. Moreover, the data are consistent with moral hazard in mortgage securitization: banks collect less information about the value of the mortgage collateral.
Subjects: 
Foreclosure Auctions
Asymmetric Information
Bunching
Discontinuous Strategies
Securitization
JEL: 
C72
D44
D82
G21
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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