Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/121362
Authors: 
Fan, Cuihong
Jun, Byoung Heon
Wolfstetter, Elmar G.
Year of Publication: 
2015
Series/Report no.: 
SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper 510
Abstract: 
The present paper reconsiders the inside innovators' licensing problem under incomplete information. Employing an optimal mechanism design approach, we show that, contrary to what is claimed in the literature, the optimal mechanism may prescribe fixed fees, royalty rates lower than the cost reduction, and even negative royalty rates.
Subjects: 
innovation
licensing
industrial organization
JEL: 
D21
D43
D44
D45
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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