Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/121266
Authors: 
Jansen, Jos
Pollak, Andreas
Year of Publication: 
2015
Series/Report no.: 
Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2015/9
Abstract: 
We study the strategic disclosure of demand information and product-market strategies of duopolists. In a setting where both firms receive information with some probability, we show that firms selectively disclose information in equilibrium in order to influence their competitor´s product-market strategy. Subsequently, we analyze the firms' behavior in a laboratory experiment. We find that subjects often use selective disclosure strategies, and this finding appears to be robust to changes in the information structure, the mode of competition, and the degree of product differentiation. Moreover, in our experiment, subjects´ product-market conduct is largely consistent with theoretical predictions.
Subjects: 
common value
product differentiation
asymmetry
duopoly
information disclosure
skewed distribution
incomplete information
laboratory experiment
Cournot competition
Bertrand competition
JEL: 
D82
L13
C92
D83
D22
M4
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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