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Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2002
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Nota di Lavoro No. 91.2002
Verlag: 
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM), Milano
Zusammenfassung: 
People have a marginal role in managing forests located in the vicinity of their villages inNorthern India. This situation is scrutinised in this paper by studying strategic play of forestusers. Thereto, a 1 versus n−1 game of people's participation in forest management is estimatedfor three institutional and historical distinct cases at the state and village level. Critical discount factors are derived to verify whether incentives exist for villagers to mutual participate in managing commonly used forests. This paper find such incentives in varying degrees for games at the state level and for games in 28 of the considered 32 villages.
Schlagwörter: 
Game estimation
repeated games
people's participation
forest management
rural India
JEL: 
C72
Q20
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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