Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/119519
Authors: 
Fabella, Raul V.
Year of Publication: 
2015
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Paper, School of Economics, University of the Philippines 2015-04
Abstract: 
Differential delivery dates (D3) of contract obligations characterize most contracts in real life. D3 puts the contractor who delivers last, in the words of David Hume (1769), in "a position of advantage" because reneging on his/her obligation can be profitable. Ex-ante remedies such as Coase's 'ownership', Williamson's 'hostage', Klein et al's "vertical ownership", Grossman and Hart's "assignment of residual rights", etc have been proposed. The principal's decision to appropriate the quasi-rent generated by the agent delivering effort first under possibly weak public ordering and non-zero retrievability of delivered effort is explicitly modeled. We give the sufficient conditions for the preservation of the incentives compatibility of the simple P-A effort-in-advance contract in the D3 environment.
Subjects: 
incentives compatibility
quasi-rent appropriation
retrievability
incentives contract
JEL: 
D52
D86
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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