Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/118703
Authors: 
Pethig, Rüdiger
Year of Publication: 
1989
Series/Report no.: 
Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge 3-89
Abstract: 
This is a comment on Urs Schweizer's paper with the above title presented at the International Seminar on the New Institutional Economics in Wallerfangen, May/June 1989. After focusing on problems in selecting rules and outcomes of rules, it discusses the Buchanan-Tullock issue of interdependence costs and optimal majority for the set of classical voting rules. Then some critical remarks are offered on Schweize's formalisation of the veil of uncertainty, and, finally, it is advocated that cost- sharing rules should be considered as a problem of constitutional choice in its own right.
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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