Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/118073
Authors: 
Mauleon, Ana
Vannetelbosch, Vincent
Year of Publication: 
2003
Series/Report no.: 
Nota di Lavoro, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei 52.2003
Abstract: 
We adopt the largest consistent set defined by Chwe [J. of Econ. Theory 63 (1994), 299-235] to predict which coalition structures are possibly stable when players are farsighted. We also introduce a refinement, the largest cautious consistent set, based on the assumption that players are cautious. For games with positive spillovers, many coalition structures may belong to the largest consistent set. The grand coalition, which is the efficient coalition structure, always belongs to the largest consistent set and is the unique one to belong to the largest cautious consistent set.
Subjects: 
Coalition formation
Farsightedness
Cautiousness
Positive spillovers
Largest consistent set
JEL: 
C70
C71
C72
C78
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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