Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/118059
Authors: 
McDaniel, Tanga
Neuhoff, Karsten
Year of Publication: 
2003
Series/Report no.: 
Nota di Lavoro, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei 29.2003
Abstract: 
Short-term auctions for access to entry terminals of the British gas-network appear to successfully allocate scarce resources and capture scarcity rent. Now long-term auctions are being introduced to guide future capacity expansion decisions. In our model the fraction of rights issued in the long-term auction turns out to be a crucial design parameter. Even a “hypothetically” optimal parameter choice can in general only satisfy one of three aims: unbiased provision of capacity, full revelation of private information and minimisation of distortions from network effects. The results suggest that long-term auctions for transmission capacity are not necessarily preferable to regulatory approved capacity expansion.
Subjects: 
Auctions
gas
investment
networks
regulation
JEL: 
D44
L95
L5
D92
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.