Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/117928
Authors: 
Dimitrov, Dinko
Borm, Peter
Hendrickx, Ruud
Sung, Shao Chin
Year of Publication: 
2004
Series/Report no.: 
Nota di Lavoro, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei 51.2004
Abstract: 
In this paper we study hedonic games where each player views every other player either as a friend or as an enemy. Two simple priority criteria for comparison of coalitions are suggested, and the corresponding preference restrictions based on appreciation of friends and aversion to enemies are considered. It turns out that the first domain restriction guarantees non-emptiness of the strong core and the second domain restriction ensures non-emptiness of the weak core of the corresponding hedonic games. Moreover, an element of the strong core under friends appreciation can be found in polynomial time, while finding an element of the weak core under enemies aversion is NP-hard. We examine also the relationship between our domain restrictions and some sufficient conditions for non-emptiness of the core already known in the literature.
Subjects: 
Additive separability
Coalition formation
Core stability
Hedonic games
NP-completeness
Priority
JEL: 
C71
A14
D20
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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