Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
Schmidt, Torben Dall
Year of Publication: 
Series/Report no.: 
44th Congress of the European Regional Science Association: "Regions and Fiscal Federalism", 25th - 29th August 2004, Porto, Portugal
National governments often choose to delegate tasks and burdens to lower levels in a comprehensive system of administration. Local and regional governance thereby becomes an important factor in policy implementation. This paper focuses on the incentive problem that follows from such a delegation of competences to collect taxes and do lending at the local level in a multi-level geo-administrative system. The paper uses the Danish administrative system to illustrate the actual outcomes from such incentive problems. A two-step estimation procedure will be used to derive results on the importance of incentive problems in multi-level geo-administrative systems. Setting up elaborate administrative systems will introduce agency problems that lead to inefficiencies in both local and national governance.
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

Files in This Item:

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.