Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/115056
Authors: 
Puttermann, Louis
Tyran, Jean-Robert
Kamei, Kenju
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
NRN Working Paper, NRN: The Austrian Center for Labor Economics and the Analysis of the Welfare State 1020
Abstract: 
The burgeoning literature on the use of sanctions to support public goods provision has largely neglected the use of formal or centralized sanctions. We let subjects playing a linear public goods game vote on the parameters of a formal sanction scheme capable both of resolving and of exacerbating the free-rider problem, depending on parameter settings. Most groups quickly learned to choose parameters inducing efficient outcomes. But despite uniform money payoffs implying common interest in those parameters, voting patterns suggest significant influence of cooperative orientation, political attitudes, and of gender and intelligence.
Subjects: 
Public good
voluntary contribution
formal sanction
experiment
penalty
voting
JEL: 
C91
C92
D71
D72
H41
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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