Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/115056 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2010
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
NRN Working Paper, NRN: The Austrian Center for Labor Economics and the Analysis of the Welfare State No. 1020
Verlag: 
Johannes Kepler University Linz, NRN - The Austrian Center for Labor Economics and the Analysis of the Welfare State, Linz
Zusammenfassung: 
The burgeoning literature on the use of sanctions to support public goods provision has largely neglected the use of formal or centralized sanctions. We let subjects playing a linear public goods game vote on the parameters of a formal sanction scheme capable both of resolving and of exacerbating the free-rider problem, depending on parameter settings. Most groups quickly learned to choose parameters inducing efficient outcomes. But despite uniform money payoffs implying common interest in those parameters, voting patterns suggest significant influence of cooperative orientation, political attitudes, and of gender and intelligence.
Schlagwörter: 
Public good
voluntary contribution
formal sanction
experiment
penalty
voting
JEL: 
C91
C92
D71
D72
H41
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
420.96 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.