Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/113046
Authors: 
Katolnik, Svetlana
Schöndube, Jens Robert
Year of Publication: 
2015
Series/Report no.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2015: Ökonomische Entwicklung - Theorie und Politik - Session: Contracts A12-V2
Abstract: 
It's puzzling that most projects fail to complete within the predetermined timeframe given that timing considerations rank among the major goals in project management. We argue that when managers can extract private benefits from working on a project, project delay becomes optimal. We introduce a continuous-time framework for project management activities that incorporates this feature. A manager's unobserved effort cumulatively increases the project's success probability, but decreases the expected duration of the project and with it the expected flow of on-the-job benefits. A strict deadline limits incentives for effort delay, but also decreases the probability that the project will be terminated in due time. In this trade-off, the optimal deadline balances the increase in expected project value against the expected increase in project duration and costs. Because the manager does not want to ``kill the golden goose'' prematurely, he always prefers a stricter deadline compared to the principal. As a result, project completion is threatened by both effort provision over time \textit{and} contractual agreements on time.
JEL: 
D82
M52
M55
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.