Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/113027 
Year of Publication: 
2015
Series/Report no.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2015: Ökonomische Entwicklung - Theorie und Politik - Session: Health Economics 3 No. C19-V3
Publisher: 
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
Abstract: 
In 2004, the German Social Health Insurance introduced a co-payment for the first doctor visit in a calendar quarter. I combine a structural model of health care demand and a difference-in-differences strategy to estimate the effect of that reform on the number of visits. In the model, the implied incentive to delay a first visit also affects subsequent visits, as the expected remaining time to the end of quarter is reduced. This effect has been ignored by the prior literature using standard hurdle count models. Data are from the German Socio-Economic Panel. Results show no statistically significant reduction in visits due to the reform.
JEL: 
I12
C25
C31
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

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