Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/110737
Authors: 
Fehrler, Sebastian
Hughes, Niall
Year of Publication: 
2015
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Papers 9027
Abstract: 
We investigate the potential of transparency to influence committee decision-making. We present a model in which career concerned committee members receive private information of different type-dependent accuracy, deliberate and vote. We study three levels of transparency under which career concerns are predicted to affect behavior differently, and test the model's key predictions in a laboratory experiment. The model's predictions are largely borne out – transparency negatively affects information aggregation at the deliberation and voting stages, leading to sharply different committee error rates than under secrecy. This occurs despite subjects revealing more information under transparency than theory predicts.
Subjects: 
committee decision-making
deliberation
transparency
career concerns
information aggregation
experiments
voting
strategic communication
JEL: 
C92
D71
D83
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
1.33 MB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.