Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/110703
Authors: 
Kirchler, Michael
Huber, Jürgen
Stefan, Matthias
Sutter, Matthias
Year of Publication: 
2015
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Papers 8973
Abstract: 
In an experiment with 739 subjects we study whether and how different interventions might have an influence on the degree of moral behavior when subjects make decisions that can generate negative externalities on uninvolved parties. Particularly, subjects can either take money for themselves or donate it to UNICEF for measles vaccines. By considering two fairly different institutional regimes – one with individual decision making, one with a double-auction market – we expose the different interventions to a kind of robustness check. We find that the threat of monetary punishment promotes moral behavior in both regimes. Getting subjects more involved with the traded good has no effect, though, in both regimes. Only the removal of anonymity, thus making subjects identifiable, has different effects across regimes, which we explain by different perceptions of responsibility.
Subjects: 
morals
market design
experiment
JEL: 
C91
C92
D47
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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