Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/109648
Authors: 
Meran, Georg
Schwarze, Reimund
Year of Publication: 
2015
Series/Report no.: 
UFZ Discussion Papers 6/2015
Abstract: 
This paper develops an analytical framework for studying the Baumol-Oates efficiency of traditional single instrument abatementpolicies vis-à-vis green defaults in the face of price inertia and deliberate defaultingby subpopulations. In this special case ofbehavioural heterogeneity, command and control approaches can outperform price-based instruments while pure tax/subsidy schemes need tobe adjusted in order to achievepolitically desired levels of abatement. We also prove that choice-preserving nudges are superior to any single-instrument policy in this case. An average marginal abatement cost rule is developed to optimise the green defaults and traditional policies of standards and prices under different degrees of market rigidity.
JEL: 
H21
H23
L51
Q52
Q58
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
338.79 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.