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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2015
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
UFZ Discussion Paper No. 6/2015
Verlag: 
Helmholtz-Zentrum für Umweltforschung (UFZ), Leipzig
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper develops an analytical framework for studying the Baumol-Oates efficiency of traditional single instrument abatementpolicies vis-à-vis green defaults in the face of price inertia and deliberate defaultingby subpopulations. In this special case ofbehavioural heterogeneity, command and control approaches can outperform price-based instruments while pure tax/subsidy schemes need tobe adjusted in order to achievepolitically desired levels of abatement. We also prove that choice-preserving nudges are superior to any single-instrument policy in this case. An average marginal abatement cost rule is developed to optimise the green defaults and traditional policies of standards and prices under different degrees of market rigidity.
JEL: 
H21
H23
L51
Q52
Q58
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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