Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/109558
Authors: 
Hamanaka, Shintaro
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
ADB Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration 42
Abstract: 
Despite a commonplace view that Asian regionalism lacks institutions, Asia, in fact, is full of regional institutions and frameworks in various forms. The rise and fall of regional institutions in Asia is an extremely dynamic process. Using a game theory approach, this paper hypothesizes that the dynamic nature of Asian regionalism can be explained by a "regionalism cycle." The institutional outcome of regionalism in Asia has been cyclical because the game played by Japan and the United States does not have a stable equilibrium. This paper tests the hypothesized regionalism cycle using actual cases of regional institutions in the field of financial cooperation and regional summit meetings.
Subjects: 
regionalism
Regionalism cycle
Asian Monetary Fund (AMF)
East Asia Summit (EAS)
Game Theory
JEL: 
F15
F36
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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