Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/109071 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2014
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Cardiff Economics Working Papers No. E2014/15
Verlag: 
Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School, Cardiff
Zusammenfassung: 
Assuming constant marginal cost, it is shown that a switch from specific to ad valorem taxation has no effect on the critical discount factor required to sustain collusion. This result is shown to hold for Cournot oligopoly as well as for Bertrand oligopoly when collusion is sustained with Nash-reversion strategies or optimal-punishment strategies. In a Cournot duopoly model with linear demand and quadratic costs, it is shown that the critical discount factor is lower with an ad valorem tax than with a specific tax. However, in contrast to Colombo and Labrecciosa (2013), it is shown that revenue is always higher with an ad valorem tax than with a specific tax.
Schlagwörter: 
Taxes
Imperfect Competition
Oligopoly
Cartel
Supergame
JEL: 
H21
H22
L13
L41
C72
C73
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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