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Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2014
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Cardiff Economics Working Papers No. E2014/8
Verlag: 
Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School, Cardiff
Zusammenfassung: 
Policies targeted at high-crime neighbourhoods may have unintended consequences in the presence of organised crime. Whilst they reduce the incentive to commit crime at the margin, those who still choose to join the criminal organisation are hardened criminals. Large organisations take advantage of this, substituting away from membership size towards increased individual criminal activity. Aggregate crime may rise. However, as more would-be recruits move into the formal labour market, falling revenue causes a reversal of this effect. Thereafter, the policy reduces both size and individual activity simultaneously.
Schlagwörter: 
Organised crime
crime policy
occupational choice
JEL: 
D82
J24
J28
K42
L21
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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