Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/108831
Authors: 
Eichner, Thomas
Pethig, Rüdiger
Year of Publication: 
2014
Series/Report no.: 
Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge, Universität Siegen, Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften Wirtschaftsinformatik und Wirtschaftsrecht 170-14
Abstract: 
We investigate the formation of global climate agreements (= stable grand climate coalitions) in a model, in which climate policy takes the form of carbon emission taxation and fossil fuel and consumption goods are traded on world markets. We expand the model of Eichner and Pethig (2014) by considering countries that are identical within each of two groups but differ across groups with respect to climate damage or fossil fuel demand. Our numerical analysis suggests that climate damage asymmetry tends to discourage cooperation in the grand coalition. The effects of fuel-demand asymmetry depend on fossil fuel abundance. If fuel is very abundant, the grand coalition fails to be stable independent of the degree of fuel demand asymmetry. If fuel is sufficiently scarce, low degrees of fuel demand asymmetry discourage cooperation whereas higher degrees of asymmetry stabilize the grand coalition.
Subjects: 
fuel demand
climate damage
international trade
asymmetry
stability
grand coalition
JEL: 
C72
F02
Q50
Q58
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
410.91 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.