Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/108824
Authors: 
Eichner, Thomas
Pethig, Rüdiger
Year of Publication: 
2014
Series/Report no.: 
Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge, Universität Siegen, Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften Wirtschaftsinformatik und Wirtschaftsrecht 166-14
Abstract: 
Itaya et al. (2014) study the conditions for sustainability and stability of capital tax coordination in a repeated game model with tax-revenue maximizing governments. One of their major results is that the grand tax coalition is never stable and sustainable. The purpose of this note is to prove that there are conditions under which the grand tax coalition is stable and sustainable in Itaya et al.s model.
Subjects: 
global tax coordination
repeated game
sustainability
stability
JEL: 
H71
H77
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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