Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/108335
Authors: 
Sziklai, Balázs
Solymosi, Tamás
Fleiner, Tamás
Year of Publication: 
2014
Series/Report no.: 
IEHAS Discussion Papers MT-DP - 2014/18
Abstract: 
There lies a network structure between fixed tree and minimum cost spanning tree networks that has not been previously analyzed from a cooperative game theoretic perspective, namely, directed acyclic graph (DAG) networks. In this paper we consider the cost allocation game defined on DAG-networks. We briefly discuss the relation of DAG-games with other network-based cost games. We demonstrate that in general a DAG-game is not concave, even its core might be empty, but we provide an efficiently verifiable condition satisfied by a large class of directed acyclic graphs that is sufficient for balancedness of the associated DAG-game. We introduce a network canonization process and prove various structural results for the core of canonized DAG-games. In particular, we characterize classes of coalitions that have a constant payoff in the core. In addition, we identify a subset of the coalitions that is sufficient to determine the core.
Subjects: 
cooperative game theory
directed acyclic graphs
core
acyclic directed Steiner tree
JEL: 
C71
ISBN: 
978-615-5447-33-4
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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