Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/108332
Authors: 
Solymosi, Tamás
Year of Publication: 
2014
Series/Report no.: 
IEHAS Discussion Papers MT-DP - 2014/2
Abstract: 
Permutation games are totally balanced transferable utility cooperative games arising from certain sequencing and re-assignment optimization problems. It is known that for permutation games the bargaining set and the core coincide, consequently, the kernel is a subset of the core. We prove that for permutation games the kernel is contained in the least core, even if the latter is a lower dimensional subset of the core. By means of a 5-player permutation game we demonstrate that, in sense of the lexicographic center procedure leading to the nucleolus, this inclusion result can not be strengthened. Our 5-player permutation game is also an example (of minimum size) for a game with a non-convex kernel.
Subjects: 
permutation game
least core
kernel
JEL: 
C71
ISBN: 
978-615-5447-10-5
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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