Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/108318 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2013
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IEHAS Discussion Papers No. MT-DP - 2013/36
Verlag: 
Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Budapest
Zusammenfassung: 
In our model, the government operates a mandatory proportional pension system to substitute for the low life-cycle savings of the lower-paid myopes, while maintaining the incentives of the higher-paid, far-sighted in contributing to the system. The introduction of an appropriate cap on pension contribution (or its base) raises the optimal contribution rate, helping more the myopes and making more room for the saving of high-paid far-sighted workers. The cap has quite a weak impact on the social welfare in a relatively wide interval but the maximal welfare is higher than the capless welfare by 0.3-4.5%.
Schlagwörter: 
pensions
contribution rate
contribution cap
maximum for taxable earnings
JEL: 
H53
H24
ISBN: 
978-615-5243-96-7
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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