Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/108295
Authors: 
Kóczy, László Á.
Sziklai, Balázs
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
IEHAS Discussion Papers MT-DP - 2013/15
Abstract: 
Few elections attract so much attention as the Papal Conclave that elects the religious leader of over a billion Catholics worldwide. The Conclave is an interesting case of qualified majority voting with many participants and no formal voting blocks. Each cardinal is a well-known public gure with publicly available personal data and well-known positions on public matters. This provides excellent grounds for a study of spatial voting: In this brief note we study voting in the Papal Conclave after the resignation of Benedict XVI. We describe the method of the election and based on a simple estimation of certain factors that seem to influence the electors' preferences we calculate the power of each cardinal in the conclave as the Shapley-Shubik index of the corresponding voting game over a convex geometry.
Subjects: 
Papal Conclave
game over convexge-ometry
Shapley-Shubik index
JEL: 
C71
D72
ISBN: 
978-615-5243-72-1
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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