Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/108189 
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
IEHAS Discussion Papers No. MT-DP - 2010/20
Publisher: 
Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Economics, Budapest
Abstract: 
The European Union used to make decisions by unanimity or near unanimity. After a series of extensions, with 27 member states the present decision making mechanisms have become very slow and assigned power to the members in an arbitrary way. The new decision rules accepted as part of the Lisbon Treaty did not only make decision making far easier, but streamlined the process by removing the most controversial element: the voting weights. The new system relies entirely on population data. We look at the immediate impact of the reform as well as the long term effects of the dfferent demographic trends in the 27 member states. We find that the Lisbon rules benefit the largest member states, while medium sized countries, especially Central Eastern European countries suffer the biggest losses.
Subjects: 
European Union
Council of Ministers
qualified majority voting
Banzhaf index
Shapley-Shubik index
a priori voting power
demographics
JEL: 
C71
D72
ISBN: 
978-615-5024-11-5
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
451.68 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.