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Apolte, Thomas
Year of Publication: 
Series/Report no.: 
CIW Discussion Paper 1/2015
We hypothesize that, in certain regime types, winning coalitions have an incentive for helping a deprived population solving the collective action problem that may otherwise restrain them in revolting against an incumbent. Recent selectorate literature holds that members of a winning coalition may find themselves in a loyalty trap after having realized a bad character of an incumbent. According to our hypothesis, the winning coalition's members can find a way out of the loyalty trap by influencing expectations within the population in a way as to spark a public rebellion. A thus induced rebellion raises the chance of each of the winning coalition's members for preserving their position in a newly formed winning coalition following a regime change. Hence, the very regime structure that makes a loyalty trap more probably is identical to a regime structure under which we should expect a higher vulnerability to public rebellions.
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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