Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/104423 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2014
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Munich Discussion Paper No. 2014-13
Verlag: 
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, München
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper applies the theory of relational contracts to a model in which a couple decides whether to marry or cohabit, how many children to have and subsequently whether to stay together or separate. We make precise the idea that cooperation in a household can be supported by self interest. Since the costs of raising children are unequally distributed between partners and children are a household public good, there is a conflict between individually optimal and efficient, i.e. surplus maximising, decisions. Side-payments are used to support cooperation but are not legally enforceable and thus have to be part of an equilibrium. This requires a stable relationship and credible punishment threats. Within this framework, we analyze the effects of policy variables such as the costs of divorce and post-divorce income payments on the interrelationships among the decisions on marriage, fertility and divorce.
Schlagwörter: 
relational contracts
cohabitation
marriage
fertility
divorce
JEL: 
C73
D13
J12
J13
J24
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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