Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/104407
Authors: 
Mueller-Langer, Frank
Andreoli-Versbach, Patrick
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
Munich Discussion Paper 2013-6
Abstract: 
Two 'order effects' may emerge in dynamic tournaments with information feedback. First, participants adjust effort across stages, which could advantage the leading participant who faces a larger 'effective prize' after an initial victory (leading-effect). Second, participants lagging behind may increase risk at the final stage as they have 'nothing to lose' (risk-taking). We use a randomized natural experiment in professional two-game soccer tournaments where the treatment (order of a stage-specific advantage) and team characteristics, e.g. ability, are independent. We develop an identification strategy to test for leading-effects controlling for risk-taking. We find no evidence of leading-effects and negligible risk-taking effects.
Subjects: 
Tournaments
order effects
leading-effect
risk-taking
randomized natural experiments
JEL: 
C93
C21
D01
L83
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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