Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/104388
Authors: 
Cantoni, Davide
Yuchtman, Noam
Year of Publication: 
2012
Series/Report no.: 
Munich Discussion Paper 2012-2
Abstract: 
Individuals’ choices of educational content are often shaped by the political economy of government policies that determine the incentives to acquire various skills. We first present a model to show how differences in educational content emerge as an equilibrium outcome of private decisions and government policy choices. We then illustrate these dynamics in two historical circumstances. In medieval Europe, states and the Church found individuals trained in Roman law valuable, and eventually supported investments in this new form of human capital. This had positive effects on Europe’s commercial and institutional development. In late 19th-century China, elites were afraid of the introduction of Western science and engineering and continued to select civil servants - who enjoyed substantial rents—based on their knowledge of Confucian classics. As a result, China lacked skills useful in modern industry. Finally, we present a variety of other contemporary and historical applications of this theory.
Subjects: 
Educational Content
Educational Institutions
Political Economy
Development
JEL: 
N30
I25
O11
O43
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.