Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/104274
Authors: 
Sung, Shao-Chin
Dimitrov, Dinko
Year of Publication: 
2008
Series/Report no.: 
Munich Discussion Paper 2008-18
Abstract: 
We investigate the computational complexity of several decision problems in hedonic coalition formation games and demonstrate that attaining stability in such games remains NP-hard even when they are additive. Precisely, we prove that when either core stability or strict core stability is under consideration, the existence problem of a stable coalition structure is NP-hard in the strong sense. Furthermore, the corresponding decision problems with respect to the existence of a Nash stable coalition structure and of an individually stable coalition structure turn out to be NP-complete in the strong sense.
Subjects: 
additive preferences
coalition formation
computational complexity
hedonic games
NP-hard
NP-complete
JEL: 
C63
C70
C71
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.