Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/104246 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2007
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Munich Discussion Paper No. 2007-32
Verlag: 
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, München
Zusammenfassung: 
Why do banks remain passive? In a model of bank-firm relationship we study the trade-off a bank faces when having defaulting firms declared bankrupt. First, the bank receives a payoff if a firm is liquidated. Second, it provides information about a firm’s type to its competitors. Thereby, asymmetric information between banks is reduced and bank competition intensifies. We find that the better the institutions and the more competitive the banking sector, the higher the bank’s incentive to bankrupt defaulting firms. This makes information between banks less asymmetric and thus leads to lower interest rates and less credit rationing.
Schlagwörter: 
Creditor passivity
bank competition
information sharing
institutions
bankruptcy
relationship banking
JEL: 
G21
G33
K10
D82
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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