Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/104184
Authors: 
John A., List
Daniel, Sturm
Year of Publication: 
2006
Series/Report no.: 
Munich Discussion Paper 2006-3
Abstract: 
This paper explores to what extent secondary policy issues are infuenced by electoral incentives. We develop a two dimensional political agency model in which a politician decides on both a frontline policy issue and a secondary policy issue. The model predicts when the incumbent should manipulate the secondary policy to attract voters. We test our model by using panel data on environmental policy choices in the U.S. states. In contrast to the popular view that secondary policies are largely determined by lobbying, we find strong effects of electoral incentives.
Subjects: 
elections
environmental policy
lobbying
term limits
JEL: 
D72
H72
Q58
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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